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Reflections
The AmericAn revoluTion:  
new DirecTions for A new cenTury
AnDrew m. schockeT
In 1909, Carl Becker pithily suggested that the American Revolution was not 
only a dispute over “home rule” but also over “who should rule at home.”1 In 
the century since, that formulation has proved to be liberating in opening up 
scholarship to the many levels of conflict that any revolution entails, but it is 
also binding in that scholarship has been circumscribed by the hoary paradigms 
of the Revolution-as-independence-struggle or as-internal-struggle. In recent 
decades, historians of early America have replayed Becker’s division—one 
that he recognized as a false dichotomy—in increasingly starker contrast. Just 
as when Becker wrote, we still have a Whig school and a Progressive school, 
each with its recognized dons, deacons, dissenters, dominions, and detrac-
tors, arrayed in the academic equivalent of armed camps and trading barbs in 
conference papers and book reviews. The two significant deviations on these 
themes have been the historiographies of the Revolutionary War and of the 
Revolution’s imperial dimensions, but neither fully defines the Revolution. 
After an explosion of pathbreaking work from the early 1960s to about 
1980, most recent scholarship has elaborated on these inherently incomplete 
models, challenged some of their elements, or tried with limited success to 
amalgamate them. The exceptions, brilliant as some of them are, we take as 
outliers, difficult to place within existing historiography precisely because they 
do not fit in established lines of analysis. But there is hope. We now appear 
to be on the cusp of exciting new approaches to the American Revolution. 
This essay maps out the directions I believe we are going, gives examples of 
recent trailblazing work, and offers suggestions about how we might move 
forward as we enter another century of scholarship.
The first path, and perhaps most important step forward, is to consider 
the American Revolution not as an event, but as the process of challenging, 
redefining, and reconstituting the very nature of authority in the British em-
pire and then the United States. That process centered geographically in the 
thirteen colonies that rebelled, but played out everywhere in the empire, from 
the Ohio River Valley woods to Jamaican plantations, and from Independence 
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Hall to Whitehall. It happened at different rates: it could have been in the 
quick succession of thoughts and feelings in the moments some colonists felt 
compelled to decide whether to be loyal to their beloved king or make up their 
hearts for independence, or in the long century during which the legitimacy 
of monarchy became gradually replaced by popular sovereignty. Every politi-
cal institution had either to find some way to reassert its will under the new 
conditions or be swept away and replaced by a competitor. In many places, 
two or more sets of institutions existed at the same time before one established 
(or reestablished) broad legitimacy. People strove to reshape new institutions 
that reflected not only new ideas about how society and government ought 
to work, but they did so in a way that implicitly or explicitly acknowledged 
continuing differences in economic, political, cultural, military, and social 
power. Although this process was at its core political, it was political in the 
broadest sense of that term: not one merely of elections and governmental 
policy, but one that involved a challenge to the very nature of the relation-
ship between Americans and the state, and by extension, with ramifications 
for every institution in America, for American culture, for relations between 
Americans, and for how Americans conceived of themselves.
Essential to this idea of the American Revolution as a process is that, to 
put it simply, people and institutions behave differently at various points of 
unrest than during more stable times. The loosening of authority, the chaos 
of war, the exhilaration of liberty, and the rage of revenge led people to do 
things that they never would have imagined doing just a few years, months, 
or even moments before. To some extent, revolution has an inherently accel-
eratory aspect to it. The process was far more complex than simply tit-for-tat 
or escalating retaliation, but prompted the improvisation of new modes of 
behavior that fit new conditions—especially as people and groups competed 
to assert power and authority in every realm of American society. Of course, 
some commonalities and restraints limited the extent and effect of the Revolu-
tion and presented bulwarks against revolutionary change. Perhaps, to coin 
a metaphor, the American Revolution was like a bungee jump. It required an 
initial plunge, after which society could not return to its original position. 
At the same time, the degree of elasticity and strength in prevailing gender 
norms, assumptions about race, and the persistence of various social and legal 
institutions, especially private property, served to restrain the Revolution’s 
ultimate results. In between, though, American life moved at velocities and 
in jerks far beyond those of ordinary life. Revolutions all have a dynamic of 
their own, and it is that dynamic that I think is the next frontier of exciting 
discovery.
At any given place and time, the revolutionary process reached its highest 
pitch as people struggled to accomplish two interrelated but distinct tasks. 
The first was to rearrange political and social structures in a series of accom-
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modations that reflected power once the empire and royalism were out of the 
picture. And the second was to establish the legitimacy of the structures they 
kept, modified, or created, because, during revolutions, legitimacy becomes the 
main lens through which all governmental actions and policies are measured 
and judged. Of course, the end of imperial rule was not the only change. For 
decades, the colonies had been growing at a furious demographic pace, both 
by natural increase and by voluntary and forced immigration, but political and 
social structures had changed little. During the Revolution, Americans tried 
to rebalance society on better terms for themselves. Slaves tested the ability of 
masters to keep them in line, and, often, to keep them at all. Wives and hus-
bands worked out new relations to each other, to their children, and to work, 
as a large proportion of men went off to war, many never to return. When 
royalists lost political clout (and their property) and left in droves, other men 
scrambled to reform local government. States’ representatives had to make deals 
with a broadening electorate—both geographically and demographically—to 
keep up the war effort. And delegates to the Continental Congress had to find 
ways to fashion compromises between the state’s interests and the states’ in-
terests, figuring out how much to ask for and what was too much to ask. In 
that sense, what some historians (especially those investigating conflict from 
the 1780s on in outlying rural areas) have called the “revolutionary settlement” 
was actually an integral part of the Revolution itself. The working out of who 
would be represented and how, of the definition of private property, of the 
role of the government in the economy, of whether or how new areas would 
be incorporated into the new polity, and so on were integral elements of the 
revolutionary process. The process ended when new government structures 
(either resembling the old, like Connecticut, or new, like the federal govern-
ment) became broadly recognized as legitimate, contained contention, and no 
longer competed with other institutions.
Thinking of the Revolution as a process rather than as an event affords us 
the opportunity to resist some of the teleological implications that have so 
warped the study and teaching of early America. We have been conditioned 
by the United States’ relative internal political stability over the past nearly 
century and a half to think of stability as the norm and upheavals as momentary 
anomalies, the result of a long buildup of pressure finally coming to a head. 
Certainly the American Revolution only became possible because of a combi-
nation of long-term structural trends and the specific actions and events of the 
1760s and 1770s. But rather than seeing those trends and events as culminating 
in the American Revolution, we can see them as a series of increasingly con-
tentious moments, of which the American Revolutionary conflicts represented 
a crescendo with their own unique dynamics, and which would continue to 
fade but never disappear. In European Revolutions, 1492–1992 (1993), Charles 
Tilly pointed out that in the early modern western world, contention was the 
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norm, not stability; he counted no fewer than 452 circumstances he defined as 
“revolutionary situations” in Europe alone from 1492 to 1791. Similarly, from 
1645 to 1760 in British America, white colonists engaged in significant resistance 
with an eye to overturn colonial governments no fewer than eighteen times; 
enslaved blacks revolted or hatched major plots to do so at least seventeen 
times during the same period; and, depending upon how one defines the 
relationship between the Crown and various Indian nations and the nature of 
the various conflicts between colonists and Indians, one could count dozens of 
instances of Indian armed resistance to claims of Crown authority.2 Thus the 
American Revolution represented both a continuity in that it was but one set 
of many contentions over the nature of political authority, as well as a break 
with the past in its pervasiveness and power.
A pair of recent books exemplify the possibilities of considering the 
American Revolution as the process of challenging and reconstituting au-
thority. Nicole Eustace’s Passion is the Gale: Emotion, Power, and the Coming of 
the American Revolution (2008) fits in none of the standard boxes that we’ve 
built for analyzing the American Revolution, playing with, but ultimately 
transcending, historiographic categories of ideology and social conflict. By 
considering the transformation of emotional performance, Eustace’s book of-
fers a new way to conceive of the many profound ways that the Revolution 
involved inherent changes in the nature of not only political authority but 
also social, class, and cultural authority. Wayne Lee’s monograph Crowds and 
Soldiers in Revolutionary North Carolina: The Culture of Violence in Riot and War 
(2001) analyzes the changing modes of violence in North Carolina over the 
course of the Revolution. Lee argued that the escalation of violence occurred 
as a result not only of a cycle of retaliation but also of fast-paced changes in 
commonly accepted behavior even during wartime. In other words, not only 
was there more violence because of the Revolution (which we knew), but the 
very nature of violence became transformed under Revolutionary conditions, 
and the process of restoring order required different strategies and solutions 
than the ones used to preserve order before the Revolution. These works, 
and other innovative recent takes on the Revolution, acknowledge and build 
upon previous contributions but ultimately move beyond our current stale 
debates, breaking new methodological ground to get us ever closer to the 
infinite ways the American Revolution was a transformative event for all 
who lived through it.
The second direction I hope that the study of the American Revolution 
will take is a greater use of metaphors and methodologies from the social and 
physical sciences. Over the past twenty years or so, the academic history and 
especially the study of early America has greatly profited from cultural and 
linguistic turns, and I hope that we do not lose sight of the gains we have 
thereby made. However, over the same period the field has suffered from a 
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relative neglect of the insights to be gained from other areas of inquiry. The 
possibilities are nearly endless: just as John Adams famously used the metaphor 
of the latest chronographic instrumentation to describe the revolution—thirteen 
clocks striking as one—there are many current methodologies and metaphors 
that we might employ fruitfully. To be fair, there is so much to read just to keep 
up the appearance of staying current that extensive outside reading in other 
areas can be difficult. But if we can do the reading, there’s a lot that we can 
learn. Consider just a few of the metaphors or methodologies that we could 
put to greater use: chaos theory, network theory, conflict resolution studies, 
sociology on social movements, evolutionary economics, geographic informa-
tion systems (GIS), and contextual data mining, to name a few.
Let me offer a couple of examples, one a scientific metaphor and the other 
an insight from current social science. Mathematicians and geographers have 
for three decades explored the phenomenon of fractals, that is, the ways in 
which complex spatial configurations repeat themselves in similar ways at 
various scales. As Benoit Mandelbrot—the thinker most credited with the idea 
of fractals—first put it, think of the shape of a jagged shoreline; looking at a 
rocky coastline through a microscope, on foot, from a helicopter, and from 
a satellite reveals recurring, nested patterns of jaggedness.3 Economists and 
historians have used fractals as a metaphor to describe temporal patterns of 
events, such as the striking similarities in the movement of commodity prices—
whether over the course of a day, a year, or decades—just as they have used 
it to describe concurrent phenomena on different scales. In one particularly 
striking example, Susan Gal and Gail Kligman’s The Politics of Gender after 
Socialism (2000) details how dichotomies of “public” and “private” recurred 
at the personal, local, and national levels in communist-era Eastern Europe. 
Perhaps the most vivid analogy is that of a military campaign, in which we 
could observe hand-to-hand combat, skirmishing units, battling divisions, 
and the movements of various armies in an entire theater. The success of 
some soldiers in besting their opponents occurs as one unit routs another, 
as a battle turns, and as armies surround their foes. Each level of interaction 
has its own particularities, but repeating patterns emerge across scales, each 
informing the other.
Of the few historians to use the fractal metaphor, David Zeitlyn and Bruce 
Connell have provided the most explicit and elaborated example.4 In their 
analysis of the emergence of ethnic identity in Mambila, an area that now 
straddles Nigeria and Cameroon, Zeitlyn and Connell looked at five different 
scales. For the most expansive scale, they panned over millions of people in 
an entire region over thousands of years. For the most constrained one, they 
zoomed in on a population of about 2,000 people over a century in a single 
village and its outlying area. By looking at one process, beginning with the 
grandest scale and bringing the focus into increasingly finer grain, Zeitlyn 
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and Connell could show the greater context in which change at smaller scales 
occurred and the distinctions between scales. To some extent, we can apply 
Zeitlyn and Connell’s model to the American Revolution. At the broadest 
scale, it involved the redefining of the British empire and sovereignty from 
the seventeenth to the nineteenth century and spanned the entire empire. And 
at the other end, it involved the decisions of individuals at very particular 
moments: to join or not to join an army; to escape or to stay; to ally with one 
side, the other, or to try to stay neutral; to sign or not to sign; and a thousand 
other little and large ways that people decided their own roles as citizens and 
as British or Americans, sometimes at a moment’s notice. We need not inflex-
ibly imitate Zeitlyn and Connell’s correlation of geographic and chronological 
scales. After all, we have learned a great deal about the Revolution from stud-
ies of communities over a long term as well as from those of only a year or 
two at the national level. Regardless of how we do it, though, we can use the 
concept of fractals to be more conscious and deliberate in terms of defining 
what scales we are working with while being able to analyze the patterns of 
the Revolutionary process.
For any given phenomenon, we can see recurring patterns at various scales 
and note the similarities and differences across those scales. Imagine if we 
were to use the fractal metaphor to do the same more consciously, extensively, 
and explicitly at every level of contestation. We would then better see how 
the emergence of competition for civil authority at the colonial level in some 
areas (such as Rhode Island’s declaring independence in May 1776) led to 
similar but broader challenges to imperial authority, and how local instabil-
ity in other areas (rural Massachusetts, for example) undermined colonial 
authorities. Similarly, the reimposition of authority at one level could be used 
to reinforce stability on another, whether it be the county justices-of-the-peace 
buttressing state-level authorities or the newly strengthened federal structure 
clamping down on local-level unrest. A fuller awareness of the ways that so-
ciety works differently at various scales can help us reconcile much existing 
scholarship. Soldiers, farmers, slaves, sailors, and women played the largest 
and most important roles at local, personal, more immediate scales; but, as we 
consider bigger spaces (both literally in terms of geography and figuratively 
in terms of political structures), then elites—and, indeed, the elites among 
elites—became increasingly more consequential as conditions at each level 
informed actions on all levels.
Among the many recent social science advances that could be of use to 
historians of the American Revolution, one in particular stands out as being 
directly useful methodologically and conceptually. The term “comparative 
historical analysis” refers to a particular kind of social science methodology 
that, with care, can be fruitfully applied to some of the main questions facing 
historians of the Revolution. Over the past several decades, social scientists 
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have come to understand better what we historians consider to be the most 
fundamental of insights: time and place matter. Reacting to, on the one hand, 
the overly generalized conclusions of large-scale statistical studies that have 
so dominated the social sciences, and, on the other, the tendency (far from 
universal) of cultural analysis to concentrate more on context than on causa-
tion, a number of social scientists have worked to find a middle ground that 
takes place, time, culture, and contingency into account in their work. Their 
studies are marked by several commonalities. First, for any given study they 
examine a small number of detailed cases, thereby rejecting the search for 
universalities in favor of explanations that fit specific situations. Secondly, 
they aim to find causality. They look to find similar causes across similar 
historical phenomena, noting as well the dissimilarities that would disprove 
possible explanations. Third, they tend to tackle big questions, such as the 
link between major economic transitions and state formation. In this way, 
although they come from different disciplinary backgrounds from historians, 
social scientists seek some of the same things: to find why things in the past 
happened the way they did, considering evidence of change over time. And 
one area in which comparative historical analysts have been particularly active 
is in the examination of revolutions.
The handful of historians who have placed the American Revolution in a 
comparative context were not trained as Americanists, and, with a few notable 
outliers, their analyses little influenced scholarly thought on the Revolution. 
Up through the late 1960s, some historians of the Revolution still referred to 
Crane Brinton’s slim but strongly analytical work, Anatomy of Revolution (1938). 
The other exception was Robert R. Palmer’s expansive, two-volume Age of 
Democratic Revolutions (1959–64), which was not systematically comparative 
and covered many revolutions while notably ignoring the Haitian Revolution. 
The main insights Americanists took from it came from Palmer’s interpretation 
of the American Revolution on its own terms, rather than from comparison. 
Several observers have pictured the American and French Revolutions as 
siblings, those sympathetic to the French Revolution casting them as “sisters” 
and those less so characterizing the French Revolution as the American’s evil 
twin. Lester Langley’s The Americas in the Age of Revolutions (1996) examined 
the American Revolution (“revolution from above”), the Haitian Revolution 
(“revolution from below”), and those of Latin America in the first decades of 
the nineteenth century (“revolution denied”). His book has been little cited. 
Meanwhile, a new generation of sociological scholarship on revolutions arrived 
as the anticommunist revolutions of the late 1980s began captivating scholarly 
attention. This new wave of historically informed, highly nuanced works offers 
crucial insights into revolutions’ causes, courses, and results fundamentally 
different from our current conceptions of the American Revolution, yet are 
consistent with the historical data that we have compiled.
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While many works could be applied, for the purposes of this essay I will 
highlight one because of its originality and texture: Jack Goldstone’s Revolution 
and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (1991). Examining the English, French, 
Ottoman, and Ming-Qing revolutions, Goldstone argued that the cumulative 
effects of demographic growth in these preindustrial societies led to pressures 
their governments could no longer contain. Goldstone’s is no simple Malthu-
sian model. Rather, he noted that demographic change affects different groups 
in a society differently. Economic growth could be a double-edged sword, in 
that more people might be wealthy, but the increase in the well-to-do might 
outstrip the number of positions conferring social status, thereby leading to 
anxiety for both up-and-comers and established elites. Thus, Goldstone’s is 
a structural/institutional model that considers the interplay between demo-
graphics and culture. According to Goldstone, long periods of demographic 
growth resulted in a set of conditions ripe for revolution, especially when 
the following three conditions occurred: a state financial crunch caused by 
a gap between the funds a government can raise without political difficulty 
and its expenditures, especially on military costs; deep schisms among elites, 
including disillusionment with the government, caused by perceived insecu-
rity and increased competition for status and positions; and broad popular 
dissatisfaction coinciding with large social groups holding the potential for 
mobilization. Usually, Goldstone continued, these three conditions entailed 
a fourth: previously fringe ideas challenging the status quo gained a new 
relevancy, energizing formerly marginal groups that led the charge against 
state authority. The societies Goldstone studied continued in revolutionary flux 
until a combination of institutional reordering and changes in demographics 
or rates of demographic growth resulted in another period of relative stability. 
Goldstone found that the ideological aspects of a revolution as much as its 
institutional upheaval set the stage for post-revolutionary change.
Goldstone’s work offers us a potential solution to a much-understudied but 
essential question about the American Revolution: why did it end? Despite the 
war, the overall population in what became the first fourteen states continued 
to grow, from just over two million in 1770 to nearly four million in 1790, 
while the Indian population to the west declined further. But, as Goldstone 
found in the cases he examined, what caused unrest was not growth per se 
but the relationships between demographic change and social institutions. 
Americans’ Revolutionary-era political experimentation greatly expanded the 
quantity and quality of white men’s chances for public advancement through 
peaceful processes. The fleeing of about 100,000 loyalists, the broadening of 
the franchise, the adjustment of city governments to allow for more elected 
officials, the increased number of state-level legislative seats, and the estab-
lishment of a representative national government resulted in an explosion of 
political possibilities on local, state, and national scales. The states’ cession 
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of western land claims to the national government and the establishment of 
a somewhat orderly process for further white colonization (especially the 
guaranteeing of eventual political equality to white male westerners) fed 
the early republic’s extensive political and economic growth, albeit at the 
expense of Indians. Enterprising urban merchants founded corporate banks 
to fuel the young nation’s capitalist expansion. The declining ratio of Indians 
compared to the rest of the population assured that their taking to the war-
path could only temporarily delay further diminution of their lands. Fittingly, 
the rebelliousness of the enslaved and the desperation of Native Americans 
continued unabated. In sum, during the 1770s and 1780s Americans success-
fully revamped old structures or created new ones in such a manner (mostly 
though not always intentionally) that there was, for proportionally many 
more Americans, greater reason to be morally, politically, economically, and 
personally invested in the new government and social order. More research 
on every level, detailing the degree to which opportunity broadened in ways 
that lessened social tensions, would allow us to better test the application of 
Goldstone’s thesis to the American Revolution.
While Goldstone’s volume does not address the American Revolution, three 
recent historical works do hint at the profits to be gained through compara-
tive thinking. For The Age of Revolutions in Global Context, c. 1760–1840 (2010), 
editors David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam gathered essays spanning 
the globe. Although nearly all of those pieces cover a particular country or 
region rather than employing a comparative mode, Wim Klooster’s Revolutions 
in the Atlantic World: A Comparative History (2009) brings to bear many recent 
insights on the American, French, Haitian, and Spanish-American revolutions 
to consider them comparatively. Klooster argues for broad similarities in the 
degree to which, national post-revolutionary mythologies notwithstanding, 
resulting regimes were often more authoritarian than those they replaced. 
Contrasting with Klooster’s emphasis on political and social structures, Leora 
Auslander’s Cultural Revolutions: Everyday Life and Politics in Britain, North 
America, and France (2009) analyzes the intersections between revolution and 
the material culture of the English Civil War, the American Revolution, and the 
French Revolution. By looking at these revolutions together and in relation to 
one another, she shows how dress, food, and furnishings became politicized, 
reflecting the gendered natures of each of these upheavals. Auslander considers 
each revolution as central to the project of modernity, albeit each in distinctive 
ways as dictated by their particular place and time.
Auslander mines one particularly interesting area for comparative con-
sideration, namely, how the entire process of revolution was gendered. 
Feminist scholar Valentine M. Moghadam argues that gender is integral to 
revolutions in their entirety: their causes, their processes, their closure, and 
their results. She has proposed two models. The “women’s emancipation” 
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model characterizes revolutions in which women’s freedom was essential to 
the project of revolution, liberating them for economic production and civic 
and political participation. By contrast, Moghadam’s “woman-in-the-family” 
model describes revolutions in which the discourse of revolution “exclude[d] 
or marginalize[d] women from definitions and constructions of indepen-
dence, liberation, or liberty.”5 In these revolutions, patriarchal conceptions of 
citizenship and nationality suffused the entire venture, resulting not only in 
minimal legal and economic gains for women but also greatly affecting na-
tional culture on every level. Clearly, the American Revolution fits fairly well 
in the latter category. Rosemarie Zagarri’s Revolutionary Backlash: Women and 
Politics in the Early American Republic (2007) offers both the broader definition 
of political authority that I am suggesting and considers the gendered nature 
of that wider sphere, while noting that the Revolution began a process that 
did not end until the 1830s. As we go forward, I hope that we can look at the 
American Revolution alongside other “woman-in-the-family” revolutions, 
such as that of Peru, to provide insight into changes in women’s roles, in the 
gendered language of politics, and in the persistence or change in the nature 
of gendered discourse at various sites of cultural production.
Even wider comparative thinking could open up all sorts of vistas leading 
to more original, rigorous, and thorough analysis of American Revolutionary 
disruption. Analogy to twentieth-century conflict has already yielded one 
provocative result: Sun Bok Kim’s experience in the Korean War inspired his 
analysis of devastation leading to political apathy in New York’s battered 
Westchester County during the American Revolution.6 Many other possibilities 
come to mind, both historical and contemporary. Beginning with the First World 
War, psychologists have completed many studies investigating what they origi-
nally called “shell shock” and what we now call post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD), a category that would encompass both the experiences of soldiers and 
of civilians. With great care, of course, to note different historical contexts then 
and now, psychological research may help us peek into the tortured minds 
of Revolutionary-era Americans during and after the war, a vein that John 
Resch mined in Suffering Soldiers: Revolutionary War Veterans, Moral Sentiment, 
and Political Culture in the Early Republic (1999), but otherwise has been little 
tapped. The past century has witnessed millions of people worldwide being 
dispossessed and strewn into the winds of fate as refugees; perhaps studies 
of their experiences might illuminate the plight of the approximately 100,000 
fleeing loyalists. Reportage of Afghanistan and other conflicts could yield 
inspiration for our analysis of how individuals and communities cope in the 
midst of chaos. Looking at areas like Bosnia might provide analytical models 
for understanding how Revolutionary-area communities resolved their differ-
ences, begrudgingly buried the hatchet, or turned to the ballot box in order 
to return to some degree of civility. Making such comparisons and contrasts 
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might be useful for historians to better explain the continuing relevance of 
the American Revolution to our students, who have no doubt been exposed 
to political figures and pundits drawing parallels between violence in Iraq 
or Afghanistan to violence during the American Revolution. Our using more 
recent events to help us understand the Revolution can aid us in making the 
American Revolution come alive for our students.
These new directions for study are not the only possibilities for revitalizing 
our understanding of the Revolution. Indeed, one additional line of inquiry al-
ready becoming an area of creative ferment is the examination of contemporary 
invocations of the American Revolution, especially in politics but also more 
broadly in American culture. Nor is what I propose easy, in that it requires 
us as historians to go beyond our accustomed intellectual silo to consider the 
historiographies of other places and times as well as the scholarly literature of 
heretofore alien disciplines. But moving in these directions holds the potential 
to explain more than any of today’s reigning paradigms and incorporates more 
scholarship, helping us better account for beginnings, middles, and ends; emo-
tions, ideas, and actions; agency, interaction, and structure; and personal, local, 
and national. This calls for the interpretation of all the sources available to us 
but without prescribing any one particular interpretation, and offers ample 
room for the huge amount of scholarly literature already compiled as well 
as the cornucopia of stories yet to be written. At the very least, if American 
historians move forward in these ways, we will be challenging ourselves, our 
students, and our readers to look with new eyes at the American Revolution, 
not only on its own terms but also in its relevance to the present.
Andrew M. Schocket is associate professor of History and American Culture 
Studies at Bowling Green State University. Author of Founding Corporate Power 
in Early National Philadelphia, he is now writing a book on the American Revo-
lution in contemporary life.
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